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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Evin Christopher Devan appeals from the district court’s summary 
dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  On appeal, Devan argues the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for relief from the post-
conviction judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 A jury found Devan guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary and 
misdemeanor trespass.  (R., p. 41.)  Devan appealed and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed his conviction  (Id.; see also Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Devan filed a 
Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief alleging he was entitled to post-
conviction relief due to “Ineffective Assistance of Council [sic]” and “New 
Evidence.”  (R., pp. 4-8.)  The district court appointed counsel to represent 
Devan.  (R., pp. 20-22.)  The state filed an Answer and a Motion for Summary 
Dismissal.  (R., pp. 25-28, 31-35.)   
The district court held a status conference at which Devan was 
represented by Mr. Grove.  (R., p. 38.)  Mr. Grove indicated he may have a 
conflict, but needed to speak with Devan regarding the issue.  (Id.)  Mr. Nelson 
was subsequently appointed as conflict counsel.  (R., p. 39.)  At the next status 
conference Devan was represented by Ms. Scarlett, who was filling in for 
Mr. Nelson.  (Id.)   
The district court held a hearing on the state’s Motion for Summary 
Dismissal.  (R., p. 40.)  Mr. Nelson represented Devan at the hearing.  (Id.)  The 
 2 
state did not make argument and stood on the pleadings.  (Id.)  Mr. Nelson, 
“indicated he met with [Devan], and that [Devan] was in favor of filing an 
amended petition if, upon review, counsel was able to find any meritorious 
claims.”  (Aug. R., p. 49.)  However, Mr. Nelson stated that after reviewing the 
record, “he was unable to find any meritorious claims and therefore submitted to 
the discretion of the court on the motion.”  (Id.) 
The district court entered an Order Granting the State’s Motion and 
Dismissing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  (R., pp. 41-45.)  The district 
court found that “Petitioner has alleged no facts to support his petition, nor has 
he established any prejudice.”  (R., pp. 43-44.)  The district court entered final 
judgment and Devan filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp. 46-51.)   
Approximately five months later, Devan filed a pro se Motion and 
Memorandum for Relief From Judgment or Order.  (Aug. R., pp. 1-37.)  Devan 
claimed that he was entitled to relief from the post-conviction judgment under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because his post-conviction counsel, 
Mr. Nelson, failed to submit evidence that would have withstood summary 
dismissal.  (See Aug. R., pp. 1-7.)  Devan claimed that Mr. Nelson failed to 
submit an affidavit by Lauren Jones that Devan believed established an alibi for 
the underlying convictions.  (See Aug. R., pp. 1-37.)  Devan’s motion was based 
upon the holding of Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010).  (See 
Aug. R., pp. 1-7, 41-45.)  In Eby, the Idaho Supreme Court held that relief in a 
post-conviction action may be granted under Rule 60(b) in unique and 
compelling circumstances where there has been a “complete absence of 
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meaningful representation.”  See Eby, 148 Idaho at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004.  The 
state objected.  (Aug. R., pp. 38-40.)   
The district court denied Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion.  (Aug. R., pp. 46-52.)  
The district court recognized that the decision to grant or deny a 60(b) motion 
was within its discretion.  (Aug. R., p. 49.)  The district court distinguished Eby 
because Devan admitted to “multiple contacts” with his counsel “wherein the 
affidavit of Mr. Jones, the alibi witness advanced by Petitioner, was discussed.”  
(Id.)  Further, the district court noted that on the hearing on the motion for 
summary dismissal, Mr. Nelson indicated that he met with Devan, but Mr. Nelson 
was unable to find any meritorious claims.  (Id.)  The district court found “that 
there was sufficient communication between the parties and consideration of the 
issue by counsel that there was not a complete lack of meaningful 
representation.”  (Id.) 
The district court also recognized that, even if there was a reason to set 
aside the judgment, the petitioner must set forth facts which, if established, 
would constitute a meritorious claim.  (Aug. R., pp. 49-50 (citing Ponderosa Paint 
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994).)  The 
district court found that Devan had not set forth facts that would establish a 
meritorious claim.  (Aug. R., pp. 49-51.)  The appellate record was augmented to 





Devan states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Devan’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Devan failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 





The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Devan’s Motion 
For Relief From The Judgment Under Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court summarily dismissed Devan’s petition for post-conviction 
relief.  (R., pp. 41-47.)  Devan filed a Rule 60(b) Motion and argued he was 
entitled to relief from the judgment because his post-conviction counsel, 
Mr. Nelson, provided a “complete lack of meaningful representation.”  (See Aug. 
R., pp. 1-37, 41-45.)  The district court denied Devan’s 60(b) motion.  (Aug. R., 
pp. 46-52.)  The district court found that there were multiple contacts between 
Devan and Mr. Nelson.  (See id.)  Further, the district court found that Mr. Nelson 
and Devan discussed the Jones affidavit and Mr. Nelson indicated, that if he was 
able to find a meritorious claim, he would file an amended petition.  (See Aug. 
R., pp. 49-51.)  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The district court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 P.3d 998, 




C. Devan Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Denied Devan’s Motion For Relief From The Judgment Under 
Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
 
The district court entered judgment and dismissed Devan’s post-
conviction petition.  (R., pp. 41-47.)  Devan filed a motion for relief from this final 
judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). (See Aug. R., 
pp. 1-7, 47.)  Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) states:  
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or 
Proceeding.  On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a 
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 




(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).  Devan alleged he was entitled to relief from the judgment of 
dismissal because his post-conviction counsel, Mr. Nelson, failed to submit 
evidence that would have withstood summary dismissal.  (See Aug. R., pp. 1-7.)  
Devan argued there were “unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief, 
specifically, the failure to file any pleadings related to Lauren Jones, a potential 
alibi witness, reflecting a complete lack of meaningful representation as outlined 
in Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010).”  (Aug. R., p. 47.)   
The district court rejected this argument and found that there was not a 
complete lack of meaningful representation.  (See Aug. R., p. 49.)  The district 
court explained: 
The decision to grant or deny a 60(b) motion is discretionary.  
Dixon v. State, 157 Idaho 582, 587-88, 338 P.3d 561, 566-67 (Ct. 
App. 2014), review denied (Dec. 12, 2014).  In the case at hand, as 
in Eby, there was nothing filed by defense counsel, including any 
response to the State’s Motion for Summary Dismissal.  However, 
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this case is distinguishable from Eby in that the Affidavit of 
Petitioner filed on December 22, 2015, describes multiple contacts 
between Petitioner and counsel wherein the affidavit of Mr. Jones, 
the alibi witness advanced by Petitioner, was discussed.  A review 
of the July 10, 2015 hearing on the motion for summary dismissal 
further reflects that Mr. Nelson indicated he met with Petitioner, and 
that Petitioner was in favor of filing an amended petition if, upon 
review, counsel was able to find any meritorious claims.  However, 
counsel stated that upon review of the record, he was unable to 
find any meritorious claims and therefore submitted to the 
discretion of the court on the motion.   
 
 Given these facts, the Court finds that there was 
communication between counsel and Petitioner, specifically there 
was communication regarding the potential alibi, and that counsel 
considered this information and determined that there was no 
meritorious claim.  Although the lack of filings can be indicative of a 
lack of meaningful representation, it does not necessitate such a 
finding.  The fact that counsel disagreed with Petitioner about the 
validity of various arguments or the value of evidence and declined 
to proceed with the claims requested does not mean there was no 
meaningful representation.  As such, this Court finds that there was 
sufficient communication between the parties and consideration of 
the issue by counsel that there was not a complete lack of 
meaningful representation.   
 
(Aug. R., p. 49.)   
 
On appeal, Devan argues the district court misapplied Eby and abused its 
discretion when it found that Devan “had not met the requirement of showing 
unique and compelling circumstances in the form of an absence of meaningful 
representation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  Devan argues there were unique and 
compelling circumstances because he alleged in his Rule 60(b) motion that his 
post-conviction counsel, Mr. Nelson, did not inform him that the state had filed a 
motion for summary dismissal.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)   Devan 
argues that, had he been informed of the state’s motion, he could have filed an 
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amended petition and submitted the Jones affidavit.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  
Devan’s argument on appeal fails.  
 The record refutes Devan’s argument regarding the Jones affidavit.  The 
district court found Devan’s counsel, Mr. Nelson, was aware of the Jones 
affidavit and discussed it with Devan.  (See Aug. R., p. 49.)  In addition, at the 
July 10, 2015 hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Nelson told the 
court he met with Devan and he would file an amended petition if he were able to 
find “any meritorious claims.”  (Id.)  This is not a “complete lack of meaningful 
representation”; it is a disagreement between Devan and Mr. Nelson whether the 
Jones affidavit would constitute a meritorious defense.  It does not matter 
whether Mr. Nelson told Devan of the state’s motion for summary dismissal 
because they already discussed the potential defense, the Jones affidavit, and 
Mr. Nelson apparently determined that it did not raise a meritorious defense.   
Devan argues that, had he only known that the state actually moved to 
dismiss his petition, he could have attempted to get new counsel or attempted to 
file the amended petition and Jones affidavit himself.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
p. 14.)  The logic of this argument fails.  The crucial information was not that the 
state actually moved to dismiss his petition, but that Mr. Nelson determined the 
Jones affidavit did not raise a meritorious defense.  Once Devan knew 
Mr. Nelson was not going to file the Jones affidavit it was irrelevant whether he 
also knew the state had filed a motion for summary dismissal.1  Even if 
                                            
1 Devan was aware the state would request dismissal.  The state’s Answer 
informed Devan that the state was requesting “Petitioner’s claims for Post-
conviction Relief be denied and/or dismissed[.]”  (R., p. 27.)   
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Mr. Nelson had told Devan of the motion for summary dismissal, Devan already 
knew that Mr. Nelson was not going to present the Jones affidavit in response.  
Devan has merely alleged a difference of opinion with his post-conviction 
counsel and disagreement with counsel is not a complete lack of meaningful 
representation.  The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Devan’s 
Rule 60(b) motion on this basis.   
 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined That 
Devan Was Also Not Entitled To Rule 60(b) Relief Because He Failed To 
Plead Facts That Would Constitute A Meritorious Claim  
 
The district court also found that, even if there had been a lack of 
meaningful representation, Devan was still not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief, 
because Devan failed to plead facts, that if established, would constitute a 
meritorious claim.  (See Aug. R., pp. 49-51 (citing Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. 
Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994).)  The district court 
found that, even if the Jones affidavit had been presented in response to the 
state’s motion, it would not have raised a genuine issue of material fact such that 
it would defeat the summary dismissal.  (Id.)   
Devan argues the district court abused its discretion because, he claims, 
the presence of the affidavit is alone sufficient to defeat summary judgment and 
the district court should not have analyzed the credibility of the affidavit.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (“The district court abused its discretion when, instead of 
relying on the presence of the affidavit, it analyzed the credibility of the 
statements made in the affidavit.”).)  Devan’s argument fails because a review of 
the record shows the court did not evaluate the credibility of the affidavit or 
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otherwise abuse its discretion when it determined that the Jones affidavit would 
not have presented a genuine issue of material fact such that it would defeat the 
state’s motion for summary dismissal.  (See Aug. R., pp. 49-51.)  The standard 
for whether a summary disposition is appropriate is well established.   
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is 
appropriate if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact.  On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine 
whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and 
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party. A court is required to accept the 
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the 
petitioner’s conclusions.  When the alleged facts, even if true, 
would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss 
the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations 
contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.  
 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted).  Where there is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the petitioner must make a prima facie showing of deficient performance and 
prejudice.  See Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2015) 
(citing Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).   
The prejudice prong requires a defendant to “show that the deficient 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.”  Id. (citing Ivey v. 
State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.)  
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the prejudice prong is a “weighty 
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burden” for a defendant to carry.  Id. (citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 764, 
760 P.2d 1174, 1180 (1988).)  A defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that the trial’s outcome would have been be different but for counsel’s deficient 
performance.  Id. (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 
(1998).)  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.)   
 Here, the district court reviewed the allegations contained within the Jones 
affidavit and determined that those allegations, even if true, were not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the prejudice prong.  (See Aug. 
R., pp. 49-51.)  Specifically, the district court found that the Jones affidavit 
contradicted the testimony presented at trial and that, “[g]iven the amount and 
weight of the evidence,” the claims in the affidavit even if presented to the jury, 
were “not reasonably likely to alter the decision of the jury.”  (Aug., R. p. 51.)  
That the court evaluated the claims in the Jones affidavit to determine whether 
Devan was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present the evidence at trial 
does not show the court failed to accept the statements in the Jones affidavit as 
true for the purposes of summary disposition.  To the contrary, the court 
accepted the allegations as true and applied the correct legal standard in 
concluding the allegations, even if presented to the jury, would not reasonably 
have altered the outcome of the trial.   
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Devan’s Rule 
60(b) motion based, in part, on its determination that the Jones affidavit did not 
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raise a genuine issue of material fact that would have entitled Devan to an 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial 
of Devan’s Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) Motion.   
 DATED this 3rd day of January, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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